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Abstract 
This paper discusses the “four-question” framework (Bland, Powell, & Ross, Barriers to dispute resolution: reflections 
on peacemaking and relationships between adversaries, 2012) that we and our colleagues developed in working to 
promote constructive dialogue and difficult compromises on the part of groups engaged in seeming intractable conflicts 
in Northern Ireland and Israeli/Palestine. The key feature of this framework is the need for the vision of a bearable 
shared future and commitment to pursue that future. Three other features of this framework are the need to build trust 
that commitments will be honored, the need for parties to understand and acknowledge the losses each will bear in 
accepting that future, and the need for the parties to settle for less than they feel justice demands, but also address the 
most serious current sources of injustice. This framework, we suggest, provides a useful lens for understanding and 
bridging the political divides apparent today in the US and many other democratic countries facing not only the 
economic threats and losses that globalization has imposed on vulnerable groups, but also threats and losses relating to 
weakening of community life and feelings of personal dignity We also discuss the phenomenon of loss aversion 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 2000) and its role in creating susceptibility to the rhetoric of hate-mongering populist leaders. 
We note the obvious need to provide a decent standard of living and greater security for the most vulnerable, but the 
further need to do so in a non-humiliating manner, and we also address the need to distinguish acceptable imperfect, 
difficult compromises from unacceptable ones. 
Keywords: conflict resolution, globalization, polarization, loss aversion, trust. 
Introduction 
Our world today seems engulfed in crises—economic, environmental, and cultural, as well as political and 
military—that call for action. Within the United States, in the aftermath of the 2016 Presidential Election, the crisis 
most discussed is a political one. The country is said to be divided into two political camps and cultures. One is centered 
in racially diverse, largely secular and “post-industrial” cities and surrounding suburbs. The other camp, centered in 
small-town and rural communities, is overwhelmingly white and Christian,  with inhabitants earning their living, at 
least historically, in manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and other resource extracting industries.  
The first camp supported Hillary Clinton, in many cases despite misgivings about Clinton, because they rejected Donald 
Trump‟s populist message. Many also saw him as a dangerous demagogue ill-suited by temperament and qualifications 
to assume the powers and responsibilities of the Presidency, The second camp supported Trump. Some members did so 
enthusiastically, others because they did not hear anyone else speaking to their grievances and concerns. Post-election 
analyses revealed that Clinton won 87 of the country‟s 100 most populous counties, and scored heavily with young and 
minority group voters. Trump, by contrast, won 2600 of the remaining 3000 counties, and handily won the support of 
blue-collar and other non-college educated voters.
i
   
Most contemporary discussions of this divide cite the challenges created by globalization. We begin this paper by 
briefly describing the role that globalization has played in creating political divisions, with a particular focus on “loss 
aversion” and other psychological barriers faced in meeting those challenges. ii  We then introduce a “four-question 
framework” that we developed with our colleagues at the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation 
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(SCICN) as we worked with peace-seekers and community-builders in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine, and other 
areas of intergroup and intragroup conflict.  We suggest that this framework, with its emphasis on the need to 
articulate and work toward a “bearable future” for the relevant stakeholders, offers a path forward in the face of the 
current intergroup and intragroup divisions within American society.   
Globalization, Globalism, and the Future of Work and Community Life 
As many observers have noted, contemporary forces have cleaved the US and other industrial nations into two very 
distinct realms.
iii
  Urban, cosmopolitan centers (New York, San Francisco, Paris, London, Berlin, etc.) today are 
thriving economically, culturally, and socially.  They are destinations for global travelers, featuring first-class 
restaurants, elegant shopping, museums and cultural exhibitions.  They are the places to be, where things are 
happening and where life is exciting.  While immigration, the high cost of housing, and changes in the job market have 
created a measure of social tension and economic stress for many urbanites, life for the majority remains rich and 
rewarding.  Most see avenues for personal fulfillment and family life, even if those rosy prospects are by no means 
certain. 
The rest, those “left behind” in small town and rural areas, have fared less well.  They have seen their industries close, 
their jobs leave, the shops on their Main Streets shuttered, and their community life deteriorate beyond recognition.
iv
  
In the US, many of these communities are experiencing an opioid addiction epidemic that dwarfs the death rates caused 
by previous heroin and crack cocaine epidemics.
v
  Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported in 
2014 that in twelve states-- Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Tennessee and West Virginia--the number of opioid prescriptions was greater than the number of citizens.
vi
  
Across Rust Belt America, an alarming number of young men have simply “dropped out” and lack any meaningful 
social engagement.
vii
  For those “left behind” there seems to be no clear path forward and, at the same time, no way 
back to the better days of the past. 
Globalization is a historical phenomenon brought about by the heightened interconnectedness of technological and 
financial innovation taking place across the globe.  Globalism is a response to the opportunities and problems that have 
arisen from globalization.  While there is no turning back from globalization, there is considerable disagreement about 
what globalist policies designed to deal with the opportunities and problems created by globalization should entail.
 viii
  
For the most part, liberals and progressives emphasize the benefits that could flow from greater cosmopolitanism and 
international cooperation in solving problems of poverty, disease, climate change and other ills.
 ix
   More radical 
leftist groups and leaders focus more specifically on the need to right historical wrongs and to redistribute the new 
wealth that flows from globalization. 
Conservatives and libertarians place their emphases elsewhere. They focus on policies to achieve increasingly 
frictionless capitalism and unrestricted access to free markets.
x
  They seek to create new opportunities for innovators 
and entrepreneurs and to suitably reward those, who make use of their own skills and energies to take advantage of the 
new technologies available to all.
xi
  But there are also some on the right who focus less on future opportunities than on 
recapturing what they feel they have lost. They see globalization not as an opportunity to create a better future but as a 
threat to the American and Western European ways of life.  As a consequence, they yearn for a return to 
pre-globalization economic conditions and are susceptible to ominous appeals to reactionary, nativist, or even fascist 
tropes of the past.  
The Nobel-Prize winning work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on the phenomenon of “loss 
aversion” offers a key to a better understanding of the rise of populism and support for the politicians who encourage 
and exploit it. Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that people who have experienced loss, or who are facing the threat 
of such loss, will undertake relatively risky gambles to restore what they have lost. Their studies illustrated this 
phenomenon with simple economic gambles
1
, but the relevance of their work to the rise of populism is clear enough.  
 Throughout history, people who are generous in sharing the economic gains enjoyed in “good times” are far from 
generous when it comes to sharing the losses imposed in bad times. Many of those in the Western World, including the 
US, who are suffering a combination of economic loss and assaults on their dignity, status, and optimism about the 
future have chosen to cast their lot with political leaders who promise to reverse such misfortunes. They are enticed by 
plans and promises to return to some earlier, more satisfying past (at least as it seen through the rosy glow of nostalgia) 
or even to build an even more idyllic and ennobling future. To do so, these leaders claim, they need only be given 
                                                        
1 For example, when Kahneman and Tversky presented subjects with the choice between accepting a sure gain of X dollars or 
gambling on the 50% prospect of gain of 2X dollars, they generally opted for the certainty of the X dollar gain. However, when the 
decision was to accept a loss of X dollars or gamble on the prospect of regaining those X dollars with the possibility of incurring a 
loss of 2x dollars, most opted to take the risk rather than accept the certain loss. 
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enough power to overcome legal and political constraints and to suppress dissidents, trouble-makers, and alien groups 
who, they claim, are the source of the problems being experienced. Where such leaders have been charismatic, shrewd, 
and brutal enough to gain the power they sought, the results for the bodies politic that have “gambled” on such leaders 
(with the dangerously erroneous conviction  that “things are so bad they have nothing to lose”) have been catastrophic. 
Globalization is here to stay, not because it offers all or even the majority a better economic deal or a more fulfilling life, 
but because it is more economically efficient than its competitors and will drive those who resist it from the neoliberal 
marketplace.
xii
  The challenge we face is how to bring about a future that is both politically acceptable and 
economically and socially bearable (or, ideally, more fulfilling than in the past). This challenge, we believe, is one that 
neither enlightened liberal or conservative politicians nor radicals at either end of the political spectrum have adequately 
addressed.
xiii
   
Deep Stories 
What emerges from differing accounts of globalization is a portrait of cleaved societies moving in opposite 
directions—one toward ever-greater wealth and opportunity and celebration of ethnic diversity and one toward 
increasing unemployment, underemployment and widespread poverty, with resentment toward immigrants and others 
willing to work for low pay.
 2
  Not surprisingly, the members of those societies produce very different “deep stories” 
about what is happening to them.  These deep stories may not be factually or analytically correct, but the vivid images 
and symbols they embody capture people‟s feelings and constitute the prisms through which they view their world.xiv  
The deep story of conservative Louisiana, as sociologist Arlie Hochschild tells it in Strangers in their Own Land, begins 
with standing in a long line patiently waiting for something you call the American dream.
 xv
  We paraphrase the rest of 
the story below: 
You are white, Christian, of modest means, probably male, and getting along in years.  You wish the others in 
line well, but you’ve waited long, worked hard, and the line seems to be barely moving.  Suddenly, you notice that 
people seem to be cutting in front of you.  Some are African American, some are immigrants, and some are 
women.  You feel that they haven’t paid the dues that you have and are receiving help from the government that 
you and your family never received. It feels like your place in the line is moving backwards.  It doesn’t seem fair. 
You feel abandoned—no, more than abandoned, you feel betrayed. 
One of those “left-behind” adds a post-script to Hochschild‟s deep story: “After a while, the people who were waiting 
have had it and they get in their own line” (Hochschild, 2016, Kindle Location 2456).  
The deep story for those Hochschild calls “progressives” (but she could just as well have identified them as the 
beneficiaries of globalization) is vastly different.  She writes:  
“In it, people stand around a large public square inside of which are creative science museums for kids, public art 
and theater programs, libraries, schools— a state-of-the-art public infrastructure available for use by all. They 
are fiercely proud of it. Some of them built it. Outsiders can join those standing around the square, since a lot of 
people who are insiders now were outsiders in the past; incorporation and acceptance of difference feel like 
American values represented in the Statue of Liberty.  But in the liberal deep story, an alarming event occurs; 
marauders invade the public square, recklessly dismantle it, and selfishly steal away bricks and concrete chunks 
from the public buildings at its center. Seeing insult added to injury, those guarding the public square watch 
helplessly as those who’ve dismantled it construct private McMansions with the same bricks and pieces of 
concrete, privatizing the public realm.” (Hochschild, 2017, Kindle Locations 3887-3897) 
Both of these deep stories are about community and fairness. However, they offer vastly different accounts of what is 
going on.
xvi
  Cosmopolitan America looks to government to promote a rich, thriving multicultural environment, as 
                                                        
2 The perception of white worker that they are losing out to minority workers is not without some validity. Eduardo Porter, an 
economic columnist for the New York Times, reports:  
“There are almost nine million more jobs than there were at the previous peak in November 2007, just before the economy tumbled 
into recession. But the gains have not been evenly distributed. 
Despite accounting for less than 15 percent of the labor force, Hispanics got more than half of the net additional jobs. Blacks and 
Asians also gained millions more jobs than they lost. But whites, who account for 78 percent of the labor force, lost more than 
700,000 net jobs over the nine years. 
The racial and ethnic divide is starker among workers in their prime. Whites ages 25 to 54 lost some 6.5 million jobs more than 
they gained over the period. Hispanics in their prime, by contrast, gained some three million jobs net, Asians 1.5 million and blacks 
one million.” (Porter, 2016) 
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something to be treasured and celebrated as consistent with our history as a nation of immigrants.  The other America 
sees multiculturalism and government measures that regulate business, impose environment protections, and subsidize 
the neediest as interferences in their communities and their lives and as symptoms of societal decline.  The more 
sophisticated opponents of such progressive, neo-liberal policies argue that laissez faire capitalism, whatever its 
limitations, has the virtue of promoting self-reliance.
 
 If America would simply return to its pre-global political and 
cultural foundations, they claim, it would become “great” again. At least, they hope it would and they are willing to 
gamble (and urge those left behind to gamble) on leaders who, while unsavory in some respects, nurture that hope. 
3
  
Rivals or Enemies  
The presence of competing deep stories need not be problematic.  Indeed, the tension between different perspectives 
can promote innovation and problem-solving.  Serious problems, including potentially violent confrontations, arise 
when the rival factions telling and living out these stories come to see themselves not merely as political competitors 
but as enemies.  The transformation from rivals to enemies, or vice versa, as we shall elaborate later in this paper, 
depends upon the answer to a simple question: What would happen to me/us if “they” got what they really wanted, if 
the other side got to call the shots?  
The tensions embodied in such polarized standoffs create a state that is often termed a “post-conflict” situation, but we 
believe is better characterized as a hostile peace.
xvii
  In fact, veterans of the conflict in Northern Ireland insisted to us 
that the status quo was not a “post-conflict situation”—for the conflict continued; it was not “post-anything.” Beneath 
the calm surface, there remained a molten mix of disagreements that threatened to erupt at any given moment, and the 
persistence of a zero-sum struggle.  Aware of that potential eruption, the parties feel that the only guarantee an 
acceptable future is the capacity to prevail over the opposing side.  Such sentiments could be heard in the explanation 
offered by a North Belfast loyalist for why she was out early on a damp, cold Ulster morning defending her right to 
march on the “Queen‟s highway.” xviii  Raising her arm, she pointed at a protesting group of Belfast republicans and 
said, “Well, if we don‟t [march], the other side will take over.” Her energies were focused not on some specific positive 
goal—her marching was not designed to help her fellow loyalists achieve some particular end-state or change in 
policies, but rather to oppose and frustrate the aspirations of her “enemies.” 4 
Mediators seeking to ameliorate conflicts (and the social scientists who advise them) emphasize the importance of 
superordinate goals.
xix
  Many see such goals as the royal road to improved relations and ultimately to a genuine and 
durable peace.  Our personal experiences in conflict resolution and dialogue promotion suggests otherwise.  The 
dynamics of a hostile peace do more than block that royal road; they make all negotiations, beyond those designed 
merely to end or avoid bloodshed, zero-sum propositions.  Third parties can point to, or even incentivize, 
superordinate goals for the parties to pursue together, but enemies fear that anything the other side proposes or agrees to 
would be a step in the direction of an unbearable future.  Relational concerns, rather than terms of agreement, we 
believe, must be the starting point in the pursuit of lasting peace. 
SCICN’s Four-Question Framework for Addressing Intractable Conflicts 
The barriers analysis
xx
 developed by the Stanford Center on International Conflict and Negotiation (SCICN) began 
with the simple question: What stands in the way? That analysis identified a number of strategic, structural and 
psychological barriers that thwarted efforts to achieve agreements to end long-standing, seemingly intractable conflicts. 
The most formidable barriers we personally encountered in our intervention efforts were created by, and were 
exacerbated by, the state of relationships between the parties. In light of that real-world experience, we eventually 
formulated a set of four questions to help parties appreciate, and to some degree redefine, the relational obstacles to be 
overcome in reaching mutually acceptable resolutions to ongoing conflicts.  
Our four-question framework had its origins in our conversations with Community Dialogue leaders in Northern Ireland 
almost twenty years ago.  Started in 1997 by citizens seeking to bridge the divisions between their deeply polarized 
communities through frank citizen dialogue, these forward-thinking activists recognized that, whatever the details of 
                                                        
3 In The Left Behind, Robert Withnow writes: “The moral outrage of rural America is a mixture of fear and anger. The fear is that 
small-town ways of life are disappearing. The anger is that they are under siege. The outrage cannot be understood apart from the 
loyalties that rural Americans feel toward their communities. It stems from the fact that the social expectations, relationships, and 
obligations that constitute the moral communities they take for granted and in which they live are year by year being fundamentally 
fractured.”  (2018, Kindle Locations 105-109).  
4 We heard similar sentiments from workshop participants from African nations describing the hostile, and fragile, relationships 
between people within their own societies. Each side believed that it confronted a “do or die” situation in which they must crush the 
aspiration of the other or face annihilation.  Given that conviction, few believed that talking with the other—or any other form of 
constructive “engagement”—would serve any useful purpose. 
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any forthcoming formal agreement, the existing relationships on the ground between the unionist/loyalist and 
nationalist/ republican communities would neither sustain the deal nor allow a better future to emerge.
xxi
 
In initial meetings between citizens from those communities (which, on occasion, included SCICN observers), 
Community Dialogue initially posed three simple questions to the participants:  
(1) What do you want? 
(2) Why do you want it? 
(3) What can you live with, given that other disagree?
xxii
 
While vigorous and engaging, and a step forward from hostile actions and reactions, the resulting dialogue eventually 
proved frustrating for all concerned.  After two years, the dialogue seemed stuck in place, spinning around an 
ever-increasing set of contentious issues in which everything seemed related to everything else.  Like spouses in a bad 
marriage, when faced with difficult questions or decisions that would require mutual compromise, the parties tended to 
change the subject and engage in recriminations.  Four themes, however, seemed to be recurrent, and we found that 
structuring the dialogue explicitly around those themes helped give direction to the dialogue without limiting the parties‟ 
ability to express their concerns and aspirations. 
First, while the past is never far below the surface in Northern Ireland, the prevailing concern and deep anxiety was 
about the future and what it held for them and their community.   Uncertainty about their future, and particularly the 
prospect of unbearable outcomes if the other side began to control events, posed a barrier to constructive engagement 
and discussion of potential trades of concessions.   
Second, there was a pervasive dis-ease hovering in the background of dialogue as the parties exchanged views and 
floated proposals, which was rooted in distrust.  The parties feared, not without some justification, that, if the other 
side gained the upper hand at any point in the future, it would reassert their earlier, maximal demands.  
Third, as a war of words replaced bombings and other forms of violence, the parties increasingly felt that the 
concessions, both material and symbolic, that they would be called upon to make (in contrast to the ones they sought 
from the other side) entailed losses too painful to bear.   
Finally, while the parties shared the desire for a peaceful future, both felt entitled to a post-conflict arrangement that 
would give them not only an improvement over the current status quo, but justice. Both sides insisted that they sought 
nothing more nor less than what they felt entitled to receive in light of what had gone before and what was required for 
the type of future they rightly sought. Hearing the other side voice that aspiration, in turn, stoked each side‟s fear about 
whether they could trust the other side to abide by the agreement if and when they found it possible and expedient to do 
otherwise. 
The four core themes that we identified could be summarized in four questions: 
1. Are the parties willing and able to envision a shared future? 
2. Are the parties willing and able to take the steps required to create trust about motives and longer-term 
goals? 
3. Are the parties willing and able to accept painful losses and acknowledge that the other side will accept 
similar losses that are no less painful? 
4. Are the parties willing and able to accept what they believe is less than ideal justice and work together to 
rectify the most egregious injustice that living together in peace will impose? 
In a sense, the primary challenge in peacebuilding as embodied in that four-question framework is the transformation of 
an enemy relationship into one that is merely adversarial and that allows disagreements to be settled and objectives 
achieved through normal political processes and legitimate institutions. This approach essentially reverses the sequence 
of steps embodied in the standard interest-based negotiation or “getting to yes” approach whereby the parties are 
prompted to trade things that they value less than their opponent for things that they value more than their opponent in a 
way that advances the interests of both parties relative to the current status quo.
xxiii
 Things that might prevent or impede 
such mutually beneficial trades, including bases for claims and grievances, are to be set to the side in this approach so 
that the parties can explore new and/or different ways to pursue their underlying interests without making demands that 
create deadlocks. 
Our experience with longstanding, bitter conflicts—particularly those in which blood has been spilled—suggests that 
considerations of the sacrifices endured, mistrust and distrust about the future, failed or frustrated aspirations, and the 
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just entitlements denied, are not easily “set aside.” Our four-question framework becomes most relevant when this 
“getting to yes” approach produces not an exchange of “efficient” trades and compromises but mutual recriminations 
about who is responsible for the stalemate. The working assumption in this approach is captured by the proposition: It is 
not that agreements produce peaceful relationships but that peaceful relationships produce agreements. The 
four-question framework is essentially a way of getting to “getting to yes.” It functions not only as vehicle for a new 
dialogue but also as a lens through which problems can be viewed more constructively and new possibilities envisioned.   
We have sat across from political and community leaders countless times and listened to them describe the problems 
and issues they face, making note of what we were hearing. Generally, we heard little about the place of the other side 
in the future being sought, quite a bit about problems of trustworthiness, even more about the losses that one or the 
other party had suffered and would suffer if the other party got its way, and opening, continuing, and closing appeals to 
justice.   
Elaboration of the Four Questions 
1) The question of a shared future: Are the parties able and willing to articulate a future for the other side that it 
would find bearable?   
No substantial progress toward stable politics is possible unless both parties feel that it could live a reasonably tolerable 
existence if the other side‟s basic aspirations were realized.  The vision of a shared future is not necessarily a shared 
vision of the future. Disagreement about specific policies, institutions, and political arrangement are bound to persist.  
Indeed, the future that one or both sides seek may be far from what the opposing side wants or would deem fair. But 
each side must recognize the need to consider and articulate the place the other side will hold in the future it seeks.  
Furthermore, both sides must communicate their vision to the other side, with an awareness that if the other side does 
not deem this future tolerable—if it does not offer dignity and a lifestyle that is, at least, no worse off than their present 
one—no amount of persuasion or appeals to principle are likely to bear fruit.  This question is the most fundamental 
one, and unless addressed, negotiations, or even attempts to create good will, are bound to be a futile exercises.
5
   
2) The question of trustworthiness: Can the two sides trust each other to honor commitments and to take the 
intermediate steps necessary toward that shared future?  
In the context of longstanding conflict, each side feels that the other bears responsibility for the onset of the conflict, has 
broken past promises, and otherwise proven unable or unwilling to make the types of difficult compromises necessary 
for progress toward a settlement.  Given these sentiments, both sides face a critical question: Why should we now trust 
you?  What has changed to make things different?  Both parties need to be convinced that there is now some new 
basis for trust.  Typically it involves seeing some new awareness on the part of the other side, or perhaps some change 
in circumstances, that allows one side or both to believe that the other side is now willing to agree to and honor, even if 
not unreservedly embrace, terms it previously has rejected.  Hearing the other side propose a future in which one is 
offered a bearable place—and above all seeing the other side act in a way that suggests it accepts that vision of a shared 
future—can be that change.  
3) The question of loss acceptance: Can the parties accept the losses that a settlement will inevitably impose on them; 
are they truly ready to make the necessary compromises, including ones that they said they never would make?  
A mutual sense of loss pervades the aftermath of virtually every negotiated peace agreement. This is because a genuine 
peace achieved by negotiated agreement, as opposed to one achieved by outright victory, demands an abandonment of 
the hopes and dreams that fueled the conflict and that allowed the parties to reduce their dissonance about the price they 
were paying in that conflict.  Both sides, furthermore, are bound to feel that it is the side making the more painful and 
difficult concessions while the other side is surrendering nothing of consequence—certainly nothing to which it was 
ever entitled.  One important purpose served by meaningful dialogue prior to agreement is that it can help both sides 
come to appreciate the extent to which the concessions being made by the other side for the sake of peace are truly 
painful—that the other side‟s concessions, no less than those of their own side, represent the abandonment of cherished 
hopes and dreams.  
4) The question of just entitlements: Can the parties work to accept an agreement that does not meet what they 
perceive to be the requirements of justice. Also are they willing to work together to alleviate or rectify the most serious 
                                                        
5 In our citizen dialogue experience in Northern Ireland we have found it useful to begin by requiring each side to present the other‟s 
views to the satisfaction of that other side. This process, which invariably produces false starts and frustrated efforts as each side 
tries to satisfy the other side that its position has been accurately articulated, helps avoid straw-man arguments. As a „bonus” the 
process of hearing the other side struggle and ultimately succeed in this task, and engaging in the same struggle themselves, builds 
respect and empathy between the participants.  
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injustices that might otherwise remain in the aftermath of agreement?   
Every negotiated peace agreement imposes not simply losses, but unjust losses on some, if not all, members of both 
parties. The goal of reaching a settlement that is deemed to be just by all of the different constituencies comprising the 
two sides is an impossible one to achieve. The question therefore is not whether the agreement is truly just for all 
concerned—it will not be—but whether the parties feel that the injustices the agreement imposes are bearable. No less 
important, both parties, and especially those constituencies within each party that could become “spoilers,” must come 
to feel that the benefits of the peace at hand are likely to outweigh the injustices it imposes on them. The challenge 
facing both parties is to work together to make the answer to this question be yes. Meeting this challenge requires them 
also to work together to address the needs of those most likely to be adversely affected by the terms of that peace. 
Justice may be beyond the reach of mere mortals, but agreement to rectify the most egregious injustices is not beyond 
their reach.  
The Challenge of Globalization: Shared Visions of the Future versus Visions of a Shared Future 
How does four-question framework, with its specific focus on the articulation of a bearable shared future, apply to the 
challenges of globalization and the strains on the bonds that hold Americans together?  What can be done to strengthen 
those bonds in the way that would facilitate efforts to create such a future? We believe a starting point for this 
discussion is the conviction that Americans have obligations to each other, and particularly to those whose lives are 
most difficult and whose needs are not being well served. While the precise debts and duties are subject to debate
xxiv
, 
and the amount of face-to-face engagement that is most desirable may differ in different communities, all Americans 
share an obligation to work (at least metaphorically) shoulder-to-shoulder toward “a more perfect Union.” 
In The Once and Future Liberal, Mark Lilla claims that America has not had a broadly agreed upon set of political 
goals for at least two generations.  What it is has had, instead, are two exhausted ideologies—mainstream liberalism 
and mainstream conservatism—that today are “intrinsically incapable of discerning the common good and drawing the 
country together to secure it” (Lilla, 2017, p. 99).  Lilla goes on to emphasize three priorities in any efforts to 
formulate a shared vision for our country: (1) “the priority of institutional over movement politics”, (2) “the priority of 
democratic persuasion over aimless self-expression,” and (3) “the priority of citizenship over group or personal identity” 
(p. 104). In a forthcoming book, Francis Fukuyama is more specific. He claims that what is required is a shared “creedal” 
identity, and the creed he feels must be embraced is the one embodied in our Constitution and Bill of Rights. That 
identity also demands the embrace of traditional American values that honor hard work, celebrate the success of 
immigrants and their children, and accept the full responsibilities of citizenship and community membership.
xxv
 
These prescriptions, pit traditional economic and class politics against the rising tide of identity politics.
 xxvi
   We shall 
have more to say later about difficulty of building coalitions not only across this political divide within liberal and 
conservative political circle. For now, we will merely introduce a distinction that foreshadows this discussion— the 
distinction between the vision of a shared future and a shared vision of a specific future. 
Parties arrive at a shared vision for a specific future, and terms of agreement to realize that vision, through the 
give-and-take of compromises and concessions designed to maximize joint benefit. The success of such negotiations 
depends upon the sharing of an overarching objective, although some more specific objectives may not be shared. 
However, each party recognizes the goals of the other to be legitimate aspirations. Each party expects the other to 
continue to pursue its separate goals but to do so only through political means rather than coercion or violence. It further 
assumes that the parties are committed to work together and honor any future agreements they reach.   
The vision of a shared future, by contrast, does not presuppose agreements about overarching goals or even the 
legitimacy of existing political processes. What is mainly required is the simple recognition by the parties that they must 
live together and that, despite discord and disagreement, their futures will include each other and must be mutually 
tolerable. In discussing the notion of a hostile peace, we suggested the question each party wrestled with was what 
would happen to us if they got what they really wanted.  The central issue at play in the notion of a shared future is the 
willingness of the parties to address the converse question of what would happen to them if we got what we really 
wanted— whether they feel that they would be able and willing to live with the future that we are offering.  
During a contentious political meeting in Belfast between unionist/loyalist and nationalist/republican factions, one of 
the participants took the stage to ask his counterparts where was he in the future to which they aspired.  What place did 
they intend to afford him and his culture, and what role would he and his compatriots be allowed to play in determining 
that future? The questions he raised needed to be addressed. But the opposite question—the place and power of his 
adversaries in the future that he and is side envisioned—also needed to be addressed. In the course of our initial 
citizen-dialogue work in Northern Ireland and other sites of longstanding conflict, we came to realize how seldom the 
articulation of a place for the other side took place without our intervention. Continual prodding was necessary. False 
starts whereby the participants reverted to discussing their aspirations and to offering reasons why they thought those 
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aspirations were both legitimate and just were a constant challenge. 
The meaning of bearable in our posing of the shared future question is obviously problematic.  What counts as 
bearable is subjective, circular, and subject to change as events on the ground unfold.  After a contentious unionist 
march through a Catholic community in Northern Ireland, we walked with our colleague Fr. Brian Lennon while taking 
the pulse of grassroots republican sentiment.  What we heard was unanimous rejection of the prospect of an IRA 
ceasefire unless and until there were changes in the ongoing “unbearable” political situation.  Two weeks later, when 
Sinn Fein announced a ceasefire, it quickly won the overwhelming support of its constituency.  In a head-spinning turn 
of events, what had been deemed unbearable became quite bearable when the leadership of their community, heralded 
the agreement as a step toward eventual empowerment.  
The term bearable when applied to a set of political and social arrangement shares the ambiguity and circularity of the 
term hurting in the notion of a hurting stalemate. As many critics have noted, it is impossible to specify in advance 
when a stalemate turns (or ceases to be) hurting.  Only in retrospect, after a settlement has been reached, can we 
ascribe the adjective hurting to a stalemate.  Conversely, when negotiations fail to produce agreement, it is too easy to 
maintain that the stalemate is not yet hurting enough.  
The Challenge of a Shared Future in a Globalized America  
For many of the white working-class, the future they hope for would be a return to a past that afforded them both good 
jobs and the dignity and self-esteem tied to those jobs.  However, disadvantaged members of minority 
communities—even those who labored alongside white workers, shared union membership with them, and often broke 
bread with them—found that past less satisfactory.  Many African Americans and Latino factory workers whose 
good-paying jobs disappeared have reservations about the re-creation of a past where they lacked full social rights and 
economic opportunities.  Both white and minority group workers, however, share the fear that jobs and prosperity will 
not return, and both seek ways to provide for their families and lead meaningful lives.   
The problem is that many white workers have come to see minority aspirations for greater equality (as well as 
immigrants‟ hopes to find a better future in America) as a threat to their own well-being. In their anger and frustration 
they search for scapegoats.
xxvii
 Minority workers, in turn have reacted with understandable distrust to what they see as 
an indifference, if not racist hostility, to their calls for greater social and economic equality. The sense of class solidarity 
and common purpose, which was enhanced by shared work demands and encouraged by shared union membership, has 
largely been lost. 
Daunting racial and political realities aside, the prospects for an economic future that satisfies those now “left behind” 
seems dim and distant.
xxviii
  While there is much room for debate, there appears to be an emerging consensus among 
experts that mass employment in manufacturing, as we have known it in the past, is not coming back.
xxix
  The 
optimistic assumption that globalization will eventually produce net increases in wealth, and the further assumption that 
such an increase in wealth will produce net increases in economic demand, may prove accurate. However, those 
increased demands are unlikely to benefit factory workers in America‟s heartland.xxx 
The rise of artificial intelligence and ever more sophisticated innovations in automation promises few new jobs for 
those without college educations and, for millions, no job prospects at all.
xxxi
  Beyond uncertainties regarding the 
future job market, our society faces the prospect of ever-increasing concentration of wealth and political influence in the 
hands of a small number of individuals.
xxxii
  Economists further predict that gigantic firms will probably dominate the 
global internet market, exacerbating the gap between “haves” and “have-nots” both within US society and 
internationally.
 xxxiii
   
These trends make the envisioning and pursuit of a bearable shared future, not only for Americans but for the world, a 
challenging task. Further daunting challenges will arise in the search for accord about trade and immigration, to say 
nothing of the need to address climate change and other environmental concerns.  The details of economic 
arrangements that might be acceptable both to America‟s various communities and to nations with differing immediate 
needs and circumstances, resources, political institutions, cultural values, and traditions is far beyond the scope of this 
paper.  What we shall focus on is the relevance of the four-question framework to these challenges.  
Building Commitment for the Pursuit of a Shared Future 
The four question framework begins with the need to envision a mutually bearable shared future, and then proceeds to 
consider three specific needs and challenges—creating trust, accepting losses, and foregoing demands for full 
justice—that must be met if such a vision is to be developed and accepted.  
Trust, and Trustworthiness: Lessening Fears and Offering Respect.   
On more than a few occasions, colleagues involved in peace-making and conflict resolution have told us that the most 
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difficult task they faced was that of creating trust between the adversaries.  While trustworthiness is sometimes seen as 
a character trait of individuals, people more commonly trust or fail to trust particular individuals to do particular things 
in particular situations.  In conflictual situations, parties who speak of the need for trust want assurances that the other 
party will abide by the agreements they make, “come what may”. (At the same time, we have found, each wants to 
reserve their right to revisit and even renege on agreements should circumstances change and the need for new terms of 
agreements become evident.) 
Standard accounts of trust in the conflict resolution literature offer limited help in our discussion here.
 xxxiv  
 Most treat 
trust as the product of a calculation that culminates in the confidence that the party with whom one must enter into an 
agreement will keep a promise.  But deeper levels of trust involves more than a calculation or prediction, they involves 
a sense of commitment to an ongoing relationship characterized by mutual respect, and an assumption that future 
disagreements will be resolved through discussion and compromise rather than force or arbitrary actions.  Russell 
Hardin‟s notion of trust as encapsulated interests nicely captures this aspect of trust when he writes:  
 “I trust you because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously in 
the following sense: You value the continuation of our relationship, and you therefore have your own 
interests in taking my interests into account. … [Y]ou encapsulate my interests in your own interests” 
(Hardin, 2002, p. 1) 
Trust does not demand feelings of personal closeness or even sympathy. However, it does demand mutual recognition 
of the overlapping, linked, and embedded characters of one‟s own and the other party‟s interests. In The Problem of 
Trust, Adam Seligman argues that when trust disappears, the risks attending social relationships becomes a source of 
danger.
xxxv
  The danger that those who feel left behind by globalization, and believe that our country is heading 
downhill, fear most is falling down the social and economic ladder.
xxxvi
     
Even those who continue to have jobs, intact families, and relative stable community relations, see their way of life is 
slowly unraveling before their eyes.
xxxvii
  Only 24% of white Americans, Seligman notes, currently believe that their 
children will be better off financially than they are.
xxxviii
  They feel abandoned and betrayed by what America is 
becoming. They look down the pecking order and see problems that they thought themselves immune to. Their fear is 
that, “if we don‟t turn this things around, those outcasts and downtrodden will be us.”   
Such fear has two components.  First, there is fear of the economic problems that being left behind will actually cause.  
The consequences in question are real and often severe.  The second component is essentially social and political.  It 
is the fear of being abandoned, of having no trustworthy partner to whom one could turn for help.  Those left behind 
no longer believe that their interests and those of the global elite are encapsulated.
 
Our concern here is more with the 
political aspect of the fear gripping those left behind.  Aristotle claimed that the city (polis) embodied more than 
commercial relationships.  It consisted of friends who were concerned about each other‟s welfare, who made, the 
deliberate decision to share their lives for the purpose of living well.
xxxix
  Implicit in this claim is the idea of mutual 
respect. 
Hannah Arendt thought that respect, as it pertains to the addressing of problems of mutual concern, is akin to what 
Aristotle meant by philia politikē or political friendship.xl  Respect is a regard we have for people that is not dependent 
on the qualities and achievements that we admire in them.  Arendt maintained that “the modern loss of respect, or 
rather the conviction that respect is due only where we admire or esteem, constitutes a clear symptom of the increasing 
depersonalization of public and social life” (1958, p. 243).  
Even after Arendt‟s clarifying insights, respect remains a slippery concept.  Margalit suggests that it includes 
recognition of people‟s capacity to reevaluate the way they live and act and to make changes where warranted.xli  Of 
course there are beliefs we may not deem worthy of respect, but that doesn‟t mean that the individuals holding and 
acting on those beliefs are unworthy of our concern. Not everyone has the same aptitude for moral introspection and 
people differ in their capacity to break with their past or change the way they live. But respectful engagement should 
always be the first strategy to consider in the face of disagreement,    
Let us be more specific and personal here. Both of us consider ourselves progressives, but we are dismayed when we 
hear our liberal colleagues be dismissive of conservative arguments and especially when they hold forth against mere 
caricatures of those arguments. Conservative contentions, even some populist complaints, should be heard, and the 
analyses of the ills of contemporary society offered by thoughtful conservatives should be taken seriously and addressed 
respectfully, even if we ultimately reject the nostrums they suggest to deal with those ills. Taking seriously does not 
mean agreeing. But it does demand that we acknowledge the authenticity of the perspective being presented and that we 
try to understand what lies behind it.  What we must always treat as authentic are the lived experiences of those we are 
engaging, and the lessons they claim to have drawn from such experiences.  Doing so is the first step toward, and 
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ultimately the sine qua non of, respectful engagement.  
Loss Acceptance: Safeguarding Livelihoods  
All negotiated agreements impose losses on some members of the parties. The price of an agreement to end a conflict 
(and realize whatever material gains that agreement offers) is the inevitable forgoing, for some, of hopes and dreams.  
Moreover, as we noted earlier, the losses that one‟s own side has had to accept feel difficult and painful, while those 
imposed on the other side feel insignificant and inconsequential—the loss of things, in fact, to which they never were 
entitled. Having both sides come to a greater appreciation of what the other side has had to give up, which can include 
not only hopes and dreams but also the rationalizations that have been used to justify the cost and sacrifices endured 
during the struggle, can pave the way to more empathetic and more positive relationships.  
Americans left behind by globalization and automation have experienced painful losses and face the prospect of further 
losses in future.  They should not be called upon to passively accept such losses. Engaging in collective political 
protest and actions to improve the circumstances under which one lives is not only an inalienable democratic right, it is 
a source of self-efficacy and self-respect. Wise social policies should reduce the risk of the loss of a decent standard of 
living in economic terms. However, they should also reduce the risk of a future lacking in dignity—including the 
dignity that comes with the loss of one‟s community or the loss of standing within one‟s community.6  
As Margalit argues in A Decent Society, people need an adequate and reliable income to maintain self-respect.  But 
they also need a sense of purpose or meaning—what is traditionally referred to as a vocation.xlii  Historically, in US 
society, employment has served both to provide livable incomes and the contexts within which a sense of vocation is 
played out. The ripple that runs through retail and small businesses when a major manufacturing plant closes, as many 
social scientists and journalists have described, is devastating.
xliii
  The problem we now face in Rust Belt America as 
good paying jobs disappear is not only how to safeguard decent standards of living, but also how to safeguard 
opportunities for people to engage in activities that give meaning to their lives.
7
  
It is doubtful, at least in the short run, that market mechanisms alone will restore prosperity to America‟s hinterlands. 
Neil Irwin, a New York Times economist, argues that the US has already paid the costs demanded by globalization and 
should now make sure that it pursues policies that allow its citizens to reap the benefits.
xliv
  Even if such benefits 
materialize, there remains the question of whether market mechanism will distribute these benefits in a manner that will 
serve heartland America.  Increasingly, sophisticated forms of automation that increase profits and wealth will 
probably limit the number of jobs that are actually created.
xlv
  As a consequence, wealth transfers will almost certainly 
be required not only to maintain standards of living but also to fuel the purchasing power of those Americans who do 
not directly benefit from globalization. 
The question of how to accomplish these transfers of resources in ways that are deemed legitimate, or at least tolerable, 
to those whose wealth is being transferred and at the same time non-humiliating to the beneficiaries of that transfer is a 
question worth further consideration.
xlvi
  What is at issue is more than the facelessness and inhumanity of 
bureaucracies, with their indifference to the plight of those forced to rely on economic safety nets and other protections 
that modern societies feel compelled to provide.  For many, perhaps even most Americans, reliance on safety nets and 
social welfare programs is for “losers”—for people who can‟t or won‟t “pull their weight”, for “takers” rather than 
“makers.”xlvii  
In The Left Behind, Wuthnow writes: “Rural communities are places of moral obligation” (Kindle Location 204).  First 
order obligations, he claims, are to oneself and one‟s family, so that one is not a burden on one‟s neighbors. Further 
obligations—some more optional and selective—extend to a wider web of relationships that support communal life.  
Against this background, it is easy to see how aid recipients who are neither disabled nor temporary victims of natural 
catastrophes are seen as lazy non-contributors to their communities and to the larger society.  
 Whereas the failure to provide for one‟s own well-being is an indictment of one‟s talents and motivation, the failure to 
contribute to one‟s community and occupy a dignified place within that community constitutes an unbearable 
indictment of one‟s character. In describing the Protestant ethic, Max Weber famously argued that dignity arises not 
                                                        
6 In Left Behind, Robert Wuthnow notes: “Talking to rural Americans, you learn quickly how deeply their identity is rooted in their 
town. Its population may be declining, but they care about its survival. It is where they know people—their neighbors, the mayor, 
the woman at the bank, the man at the farmers‟ co-op. Maybe they grew up here. Maybe they own land. They care if the home team 
has a winning football season. They take pride in their community spirit.” (2018, Kindle Locations 99-102).  
7 We cannot resist noting that those in the upper reaches of society who do not hold real jobs but benefit from great family wealth 
rarely feel that their situation is “undignified.” Nevertheless, many do seek pursuits that give them a sense of identity, for some as 
sportsmen or hobbyists, but for some as public benefactors and activists for social or political causes they deem worthy.  
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from the industriousness of work itself but from the sense that one is living a worthy and meaningful life—from the 
sense of vocation or calling that God has commissioned.
8
  While the notion of religious calling has diminished since 
Weber‟s time, for most Americans, their identities and sense of social worthiness continues to rest heavily on their job 
or occupation.   
In Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his colleagues built upon Tocqueville‟s observation about the American 
penchant for community involvement. Tocqueville thought that “the experience of getting involved in local volunteer 
civic associations was itself capable of generating a sense of responsibility for the public good” (1985, p168).  For 
Bellah, as for Tocqueville, the vector of responsibility runs from the individual to the community.  The reverse is also 
true: engagement in community activity leads participants to take responsibility for the individuals served by that 
activity.  Martin Luther King, Jr., in the preface to Strides toward Freedom, wrote that the marchers who engaged in 
the struggle to gain their freedom “acquired a new estimate of their own human worth” (1958, p xxix).  The struggle to 
safeguard dignity for those left behind by globalization, we believe, is a shared responsibility. Participation in that 
struggle does more than fulfill an obligation, it can reinforce the sense of person worth for all concerned.    
Satisfying Demands for Justice versus Fostering Dignity  
The four-question formulation we described earlier holds that while justice is a necessarily component of any lasting 
settlement, prioritizing the immediate pursuit of justice, especially justice for all, is a barrier too high to clear.  Instead, 
we suggested, the parties would be better served by working together to rectify the most egregious sources of injustice 
that exist or that would be inflicted by the terms of any agreement that is feasible and efficient.  For example, ending 
one group‟s monopoly on jobs in a particular public or private sector may demand the displacement of workers who 
have done a good job, and who have made life choices assuming their jobs would continue. There may be no way of 
avoiding such job losses, but both fairness considerations and the need to reduce opposition to the relevant agreement 
can be served by providing generous pensions for workers approaching retirement age.  Special retraining and 
placement assistance, especially for younger workers, and some creative thinking about creation of new job 
opportunities that would utilize the displaced workers‟ skills would further serve those goals.  
In Strangers in Their Own Land, Arlie Hochschild observes that both the right and left in the US “call for an honest 
day‟s pay for an honest day‟s work” (Hochschild, 2016, Kindle location 2529-2530).  For many who have come to 
support the Republican Party, especially those we label as populists, the unfairness that exists in the US is rooted in 
“makers” versus “takers”—those who work hard and support themselves and their families (or seek only a chance to do 
so) versus those who line up local welfare offices, receive undeserved disability checks and government assistance, and 
otherwise “game the system” to avoid working to earn an honest living.  For many Democrats, especially those in the 
left wing of that party, unfairness in America today is rooted in the current distribution of the economic pie. They note 
that globalization and automation have hugely increased the share going to those in corporate boardrooms and executive 
offices at the expense of those who are struggling to make ends meet. The flashpoints of conflict for those on the right 
are between the struggling middle class and the poor.  For those for the left, the focus of discontent involves the 
disparity in wealth and political power between the 1% at the very top of the economic ladder and the other “99 
percent”, especially those at the lowest rungs of that ladder, and those whose race has prevented them from rising on 
that ladder. 
Many who support the progressive agenda of the Democratic Party, occupy the rungs just below that top 1%. They are 
the “next 9%” whose incomes have risen sharply in recent years and whose share of the economic pie has increased. 
xlviii
  This group includes professors and professionals, engineers, and others whose special skills are well compensated 
and are able not only to provide well for their families, but transmit the social capital that will allow their children to 
follow in their well-heeled footsteps. Ironically, it is they, rather than the top 1% to whom the anger of those left behind 
is most often directed. Many white working class Americans feel that they have been abandoned and ignored by coastal 
elites who are more concerned with social issues and the righting of past civil wrongs than with the economic plight of 
their fellow citizens and the destruction of their way of life. 
Rectifying the many sources of grievance and conflicting claims of the aggrieved in American society, may not be 
possible in today‟s political climate. Rather than pursuing that elusive goal, Avishai Margalit suggests the more 
reachable and morally appropriate goal of a “decent society.”xlix  Such a society, he claims, is one that does not 
humiliate its members and affords dignity to all.  While just societies must be decent, Margalit suggests that societies 
                                                        
8 Prior to the rise of Protestantism, religious devotion involved a rejection of the affairs of the world.  Weber argued that, when 
Protestantism challenged the formula for salvation offered by the Catholic Church, its adherents began to look elsewhere for signs 
of their salvation.  Worldly success, he claimed, became one of those signs, and Protestants began to pursue not only worthy 
secular vocations, but also the accumulation of wealth, with almost fanatical zeal (Weber, 2002).   
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can be decent without satisfying all legitimate claims for justice.  He rejects the metaphor of climbing a mountain 
whereby justice lies at the summit and decency is a way-station below the summit.  Instead he suggests that we 
envision ourselves as amateur pilots who want to fly to the idyllic Hawaiian Islands from somewhere in the heartland of 
America but don‟t have fuel to get there.  Getting as close as possible before the fuel runs out would leave us in a 
downed plane somewhere in the middle of the Pacific.  A better plan would be to fly to Miami—not quite the tropical 
paradise we hoped for, but a pretty good place to escape the winter! Margalit does not suggest that we abandon the goal 
of a just society—we can continue to dream about and save our dollars for that trip to Hawaii—only that we not let that 
goal keep us from pursuing and achieving the more modest goal of a decent society.  
The ideal of justice as fairness is an idea that has long dominated discussions of distributive justice. It was offered with 
particular force by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice.
l
  There, he suggested that we need to give special attention to 
the perspectives of the less powerful. His famous thought experiment asks us to place ourselves behind a “veil of 
ignorance” as to our potential ranking in the society as we consider the fairest and most appropriate distribution of 
wealth. Given that task, Rawls submits, we would opt for moderate rather than huge discrepancies between the most 
and least favored.  
Psychologists are skeptical about the usefulness of Rawls thought experiment. They cite the “bias blind spot” that leads 
people to imagine that their current perspectives are already objective and to feel that they are immune to the 
self-serving biases that affect others. Economically favored Americans today are all too able to rationalize the gap 
between their circumstance and the circumstances of their less fortunate compatriots. 
li
 Also, when asked about the 
ideal distribution of wealth in their country, most respondents express a preference for unequal outcomes that give 
weight to the merit of claims over outcomes that arbitrarily impose equality.
lii9
  Nevertheless, in accord with Rawls 
claim, researchers find that most Americans, when given the choice, endorse a distribution of wealth that is far 
“flatter” than the one that exists today. In fact, the ideal distribution described by this representative sample of 
Americans was dramatically more equal than exists anywhere in the world.
 liii
 
In the context of globalization and globalist policies, those left behind feel that their past efforts and sacrifice have not 
be fairly acknowledged and taken into consideration.  In A Hillbilly Elegy, J. D. Vance asserts that the American 
Dream disappeared in his community when it failed to provide a steady wage.
liv
   On closer examination, however, his 
narrative may have less to do with the loss of material comforts than with the humiliation created by the lack of a steady 
wage.
10
 When people are afforded dignity and respect, they may or may not accept unequal outcomes (depending on 
how much that inequality violates their sense of fairness).  But they will pointedly resist unequal outcomes that 
undermine their individual dignity and their collective identity as members of a community that is worthy of concern 
and respect. 
Populism as a Threat to the Pursuit of a Shared Future 
Jan-Werner Muller characterizes populism as a political ideology that sets a pure and unified people against dangerous 
outsiders.
lv
 These outsiders include not only immigrants and ethnic or racial minorities, but in many cases also cultural 
and economic elites whom populist leaders label as corrupt or morally inferior. The foundation of populism is the 
identification of a hardworking, innocent, wholesome group characterized as “the real people” who now must struggle 
against all who would undermine their way of life.  Casting aside facts, it speaks of a greatness and purity that once 
was, and is now to be restored. In short, populism mobilizes a Manichean worldview in which absolute good opposes 
absolute evil. For a minority of Americans, but by no means a small minority, the US and the West more generally is in 
a fight for survival in which nothing short of the total annihilation and banishment threatening, evil “other” will 
constitute victory. 
Populism, Muller interestingly claims, exists only in the context of representative government and majoritarian 
elections. As such, it is democracy‟s “permanent shadow.”lvi Populist candidates test the will of the electorate, but 
populism involves more than an effort to win majority support for leaders who espouse populist aspirations. It claims 
special license as the authentic and unambiguous expressions of the “real people‟s” will and acknowledges no 
responsibility to take into account the diverse claims and aspirations that compete for support in any true democracy. 
                                                        
9 However it is worth noting both the popularity and the perceived legitimacy of programs that offer equal tax-funded benefits 
(including social security payments, health care, access to recreational or educational facilities) to rich and working-class alike, 
even when those programs are supported by progressive taxation of wealth and/or income. 
10 Psychologist Evelin Linder offers extended discussions of the damaging effects of humiliation in conflict around the world and 
suggests steps needed to create non-humiliating global communities (e.g. Linder, 2001, 2006). She also describes her own remarkable 
personal career as a nomadic investigator and community builder. 
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The rising tide of populism in the US, and elsewhere in the world, has destabilized political establishments and led to 
the realignment of political allegiances. While political upheavals can be constructive, those manifest in the current rise 
of populism have undermined the very institutions that contributed to the growing prosperity and unprecedented 
security so many working class Americans enjoyed in decades following the end of the Second World War.
 lvii
   
Populism‟s challenge to liberal democracy, especially in the context of the dislocation and displacement of 
globalization, pointedly raises the question of who “counts” in the relevant shared future—who is included in, and who 
is excluded from, the demos?  Given the scourges of racism and white supremacy that sully our history, it is a question 
with profound moral and political implications.
 lviii
 
In a blistering indictment of Donald Trump and Trump voters published The Atlantic, Ta-Nehisi Coates marshals the 
damning facts of ongoing racism and castigates main-line journalists for focusing so much attention on the plight of 
white working class Americans and ignoring, or at least downplaying, evidence of the renewed racism that has been 
unleashed in the current US political environment.
 lix 
 He claims that reference to the white working class as a real and 
distinct community has become a rhetorical device for silencing those who insist on including issues of inclusiveness 
and diversity in discussions of Americans‟ shared future.  
The Pros and Cons of Compromise 
There is an obvious need for a viable political agenda that could unite rather than divide those in danger of being left 
behind and those seeking to catch up.  While we have not tried to suggest the appropriate tradeoffs in such an agenda, 
we have identified and highlighted some core themes that underpin the “shoulder-to-shoulder” politics of a shared 
future —fostering dignity, safeguarding livelihoods, and encouraging respect.  A central question that will have to be 
addressed is when, and over what, the parties pursuing the vision of a bearable shared future might need to compromise. 
In On Compromise and Rotten Compromises, Avishai Margalit explicitly discusses the role of compromise in balancing 
desires for peace and desires for justice.  In that discussion, he makes a distinction between the types of painful 
compromises that must sometimes be endured to secure the blessings of peace and the opportunities it affords, and 
rotten compromises, which he sees as morally impermissible and must be avoided “come what may”—that is, 
regardless of circumstances and costs to be borne.
 lx
  All other compromises, he argues, must be evaluated on their 
own merits on a “retail” or case-by case basis.  
The issue is not whether bad compromises—that is, shady compromises (“deals that serve suspicious motives”), shoddy 
compromises (acceptance of “phony goods” in exchange for things of real value), or shabby compromises (exploitative 
exchanges that take “advantage of the vulnerability of the weaker party”)—should be accepted when better deals could 
be made.
 lxi
   Margalit writes: “These are all forms of morally bad deals, yet given the alternatives, they might on 
occasion be justified” (p. 4).  Whether a compromise is to be accepted or rejected, even an unjust one, depends upon 
the specific burdens it imposes and/or perpetuates, the longer-term outcomes likely to result from it, and how the 
balance of burdens and benefits will be allocated and shared by the weak and/or disadvantaged versus the strong and/or 
advantaged.
 
 
Margalit offers the provocative claim that we should be “judged by our compromises more than by our ideals” (p. 5).  
Our ideals indicate what we would most like, but our compromises reveal our ultimate priorities and what prices we 
will pay to achieve those priorities. The dynamics of power cannot be overlooked in such assessments of morality.  
Compromises that are coerced or imposed are suspect.  Free consent of the weaker party is the defining factor.  It is 
the weaker party that must decide whether to accept terms that unjust or morally suspect.  The stronger party should 
simply refrain from offering morally bad terms.  
Summing up 
We have described the “four-question” framework that we and our SCICN colleagues developed in the course of work 
encouraging constructive dialogue and difficult compromises on the part of parties engaged in seeming intractable 
conflicts in various parts of the world. We have further suggested that the same framework could provide a useful lens 
for examining the political divides that we see in the US and many other democratic countries facing the challenges of 
globalization. We have acknowledged the economic threats and losses that globalization has imposed, but beyond those 
losses we have focused on the role that the loss of dignity, recognition, and community standing, is playing in creating 
divisions, fueling resentment, and stoking the fires of populism and intolerance. We have had little to say about the 
design of potentially ameliorate economic policies. We have merely acknowledged the obvious need to provide a decent 
standard of living and greater security for the most vulnerable, and the need to deliver those benefits in a 
non-humiliating manner. Our main suggestions have pertained to strategies to address problems of distrust, the 
particular susceptibility to hate-mongering populist leaders shown by those who are feeling the most painful losses, and 
the thorny question of just entitlements. While we have cited the need for compromise and willingness to engage in 
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difficult exchanges of views, we have also tried to distinguish necessary but painful compromises from ones we deem 
unacceptable. We hope our efforts will encourage others to take up the challenges and opportunities required to create, 
and realize, a shared future that is not only bearable but satisfying and even ennobling.  
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